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To put it bluntly, Physicalism is the thesis that everything that exists is physical.  Although Physicalism enjoys a great deal of popularity, two widely accepted theses
(1) the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects they study, and 
(2) dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties 
seem to guarantee that, under some sense of the word, the physical sciences are fated to give us an “incomplete” picture of what exists.  In what follows, this challenge to Physicalism will be referred to as “the challenge of categorical properties”.
This paper offers a new response to this challenge.  In doing so, it focuses on the Thesis 2—dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties.  This claim does not just threaten to limit the reach of the physical sciences and thereby create problems for the thesis of Physicalism; it also generates problems for the more general project of analyzing the nature of dispositional and categorical properties.  This paper will argue that a new and promising solution to the latter problem (the problem of explaining the dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties) also provides an intriguing reply to the challenge of categorical properties.

2. The Challenge of Categorical Properties
As stated earlier, Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical.  Following the lead of David Armstrong (1997), one can distinguish Weak Physicalism—the thesis that everything in spacetime is physical—from Strong Physicalism—the thesis that everything tout court is physical. The problem for Physicalism under discussion in this paper can be generated using either Weak or Strong Physicalism; for expositional purposes, however, the focus will be on Weak Physicalism.
The standard way of understanding “the physical” involves an appeal to physics or, more generally, the physical sciences.  Under this approach, a “physical property” is a property posited by physics or posited by the physical sciences. (To be clear, Physicalism is not a theory just about properties; it is also a theory about objects, events, processes, etc.  This paper, however, will focus only on properties.)  Definitions of Physicalism that appeal to physics/the physical sciences in this manner will be referred to as “physics-based definitions of Physicalism”.  
With this definition of “the physical” in hand, the next project is to analyze the sense in which everything is supposed to be physical.  The recent trend is to analyze this idea using a supervenience claim.​[1]​  Frank Jackson (1998), for instance, interprets the sense in which everything supervenes upon the physical via the following claim:

Any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world.  (p. 12, his emphasis)

A “minimal physical duplicate” of our world is a world that is exactly like our world in all physical respects and while containing no additional entities.  (Given the above explication of “the physical”, a minimal physical duplicate would be a world that from the perspective of the physical sciences is exactly like our world.​[2]​)  If Physicalism is false of the actual world, then a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world will not be a duplicate simpliciter of it, for the actual world will contain entities above and beyond the entities contained by a minimal physical duplicate of it.
To see the challenge that Thesis 1 and Thesis 2 present to Physicalism, one first needs to grasp the basic idea of dispositional and categorical properties. As Nelson Goodman (1965, p. 40) puts it, an idea of a dispositional property is an idea of a property that is “full of threats and promises.” Dispositional properties point beyond whatever object they are instantiated in to possible manifestations/causal interactions with other objects that may not be occurring and which, in fact, may never occur. The solubility of a piece of salt, for example, is a property that points beyond that salt to various manifestations (e.g. dissolving) and various causal interactions with other objects (e.g. water) that may not be occurring and which, in fact, may never occur. 
This paper will assume that the dispositional properties of an object are intrinsic properties of that object, properties that are really there and ready to go in the object even if the manifestations/causal interactions that they point to are not presently occurring.​[3]​  But what, exactly, does it mean to say that dispositional properties are “intrinsic”? There is a large and complex literature on how the analyze the notion of an intrinsic property more generally.​[4]​  In this narrow context, however, it will suffice to interpret the claim that dispositional properties are intrinsic properties as being the claim that two objects that are intrinsic duplicates will have the same dispositions (assuming that the laws of nature are held constant).​[5]​   
The pointing of dispositional properties to various manifestations/causal interactions has tempted some to offer a conditional analysis of these properties.  Under such an account, the solubility of salt would be analyzed in terms of the truth of a particular subjunctive conditional.  This paper will follow the lead of many others (Martin (1994), in particular) in thinking that since dispositional properties are intrinsic properties, it is a mistake to try to reduce them to relations to possible manifestations.  Following the suggestion of both Martin (1996) and Bird (2007), such subjunctive conditionals can be treated as being a rough guide to a property’s dispositionality, but not as an analysis of it.  
Unlike concepts of dispositional properties, concepts of categorical properties do not characterize their referents as pointing to possible manifestations or causal interactions beyond the objects that possess them.  (Notice that this is not the same as saying that categorical concepts characterize their referents as not pointing to any possible manifestations/causal interactions beyond the objects that possess them.  Categorical concepts are silent on whether their referents point to manifestations/causal interactions beyond the objects that possess them. This point will be important later on.)  Instead, they characterize their referents as entities that just sort of sit there, constantly exhibiting their nature.  Perhaps it can be put it this way: The idea (or concept) of a categorical property is an idea of a way an object continually is on its own, not a way of how it would behave in various circumstances. 
With the above (admittedly rough) conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties in place, it’s time to take a look at the first thesis, the one about the subject matter of the physical sciences. 

Thesis 1: The physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of objects.

The physical sciences study how objects behave in various settings and how they interact with one another (i.e. they study their dispositional properties) and not how these objects are (categorically) by themselves, independent of those settings and interactions.  Put more simply, the physical sciences are interested in what objects do (or would do), and not in what they are apart from what they do.  Consider, for example, some of the properties that are the focus of the crown jewel of the physical sciences: Physics. 

…mass is knowable only by its dynamic effects.  Turn up the magnification and we find things like an electrical charge at a point, or rather varying over a region, but the magnitude of a field at a region is known only through its effects on other things in spatial relation to that region.  A region with charge is very different from a region without…It differs precisely in its dispositions or powers.  (Blackburn 1990, p. 63)

To again borrow the words of Simon Blackburn, it seems that “science finds only dispositional properties, all the way down.” (p. 63) 
Now consider the second thesis, the one concerning the dependence of dispositional properties upon categorical properties.

Thesis 2: Dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties in the sense that categorical properties need to be co-instantiated alongside dispositional properties in whatever objects have those dispositional properties. There cannot be an object with just dispositional properties.​[6]​  

Thesis 1 says that the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of objects.  But is it possible for an object to only have dispositional properties? Could all the properties of concrete spatiotemporal objects be purely dispositional in nature?  According to Thesis 2, the answer to these questions is no.
Many have thought that the idea of a world consisting of objects with nothing but dispositional properties is difficult to conceive of, if not outright incoherent.​[7]​  If objects did not have categorical properties in addition to having dispositional properties, then it seems like there would be nothing there to affect other things or be affected by other things.  Here’s another way to illustrate the concern: It is difficult to tell the difference between a world of objects that only have dispositional properties and a world containing nothing but empty space.​[8]​ 
	Taken together, Theses 1 and 2 seem to guarantee that the physical sciences are fated to provide an incomplete catalogue of the properties of the world: Thesis 1 says that the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects of our world while Thesis 2 says that those objects must have more properties than just their dispositional properties.  And this, in turn, means that Physicalism is destined to be false.​[9]​  There are several ways for a Physicalist to respond to this problem.  She might accept the claim that the physical sciences only tell us about dispositional properties (Thesis 1) but then reject the claim that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties (Thesis 2); in short, she might argue that all properties are dispositional in nature and, hence, that there is no in-principle limitation to how far the physical sciences can reach and no problem for physics-based definitions of Physicalism.  (Under such a “Dispositionalist” approach to properties, there would be a necessary connection between a given type of property and the dispositional powers that property conveys to its bearers—the essence of a property would be exhausted by the powers it conveyed.​[10]​)  This paper, however, will approach the problem from another angle; it will give a response to the challenge of categorical problems that accepts Thesis 2.
To date, there have been two such responses.  First, Daniel Stoljar (2001 and 2006) has argued that there are two legitimate conceptions of “the physical”: One governed by the physics-based definition given earlier in this paper (Stoljar calls this the “theory-based conception of Physicalism”), the other governed by an ostensive definition. According to the latter—which Stoljar calls the “object-based conception of Physicalism”—a property counts as physical if (roughly) it is the kind of property that would be posited by a complete account of paradigmatic physical objects (like stones and trees). Under Stoljar’s approach, then, the set of “theory-based” physical properties contains only dispositional properties, while the set of “object-based” physical properties contains both dispositional and categorical properties.
This is an interesting response to the challenge of categorical properties and Stoljar puts it to use in provocative ways in responding to classic anti-Physicalist arguments from the arena of philosophy of mind.  But this paper will hold out for something better: Namely, a reply to the challenge of categorical properties that sticks with an exclusively physics-based definition of Physicalism.  (After all, an adequate reply to the challenge that is able to retain a unitary definition of Physicalism is to be preferred to a reply, such as Stoljar’s, that gives a bifurcated definition of Physicalism.)
To explain the other reply that’s been given to the challenge of categorical properties, turn your attention back to Thesis 1.  Both Jackson (1998) and Stoljar (2001 and 2006) have pointed out that there is an ambiguity in the claim that the physical sciences can (or cannot) “tell” us about a property.  One sense in which the physical sciences could tell us about a property is simply by referring to it.  And there is no reason to think that the physical sciences are incapable of referring to categorical properties. Jackson (1998, p. 23) illustrates this point by raising the possibility that the physical sciences use “relational names” (names that highlight the causal relations that the tokens of these properties partake in) to refer to properties that are, in fact, categorical in nature.
	Under the reading of “tell” where the physical sciences tell us about properties if they refer to them, the physical sciences could, in principle, tell us about all the properties of the objects of our world, including their categorical properties.  So under this reading, Physicalism is not guaranteed to be false; a world that contained all and only the entities referred to by the physical sciences could, in principle, be a duplicate simpliciter of our world.  But a serious problem remains: Even if the physical sciences could, in principle, refer to all the properties of the objects of our world (including their categorical properties), they cannot epistemically distinguish all of these properties.  Both Jackson (1998) and Stoljar (2001 and 2006) illustrate the problem by asking us to consider two worlds that are exactly alike in terms of their distribution of dispositional properties while differing in terms of their distribution of categorical properties.  The differences between these worlds would be indiscernible from the perspective the physical sciences!
Jackson (1998), for one, is willing to live with this consequence.
  
I think we should acknowledge as a possible, interesting position one we might call Kantian Physicalism.  It holds that a large part (possibly all) of the intrinsic nature of our world is irretrievably beyond our reach, but that all the nature we know about supervenes upon the (mostly or entirely) causal cum relational nature that the physical sciences tell us about. (p. 24)​[11]​  

Although there is nothing in this position that looks like transcendental idealism, it is “Kantian” in that it posits something akin to the noumena—namely, a class of properties that are guaranteed to be unknowable.  (Indeed, the idea that there are intrinsic properties—properties that this paper would describe as “categorical”—that are guaranteed to be unknowable (for reasons similar to those offered above) has been developed by Langton (1998) into an interpretation of Kant’s noumena!)
Although Jackson is comfortable with Kantian Physicalism, this paper will hold out for something better: Namely, a Physicalist response to the challenge of categorical properties that accepts Thesis 2 (unlike the Dispositionalist), sticks with a unitary physics-based definition of Physicalism (unlike Stoljar’s response), and doesn’t entail that the physical sciences will be unable to epistemically distinguish a kind of property (unlike Kantian Physicalism).  A tall order, but one that is within reach given the right account of dispositional and categorical properties.  The key to delivering on this promise is to take a closer look at Thesis 2 and at the metaphysical nature of dispositional and categorical properties.  

3. The Dependence of Dispositional Properties upon Categorical Properties
The claim that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties (in combination with Thesis 1) seems to guarantee that physics-based definitions of Physicalism are doomed to be false or, at the very least, seriously compromised in that we’ll either have to bifurcate our definition of “the physical” or have to adopt some form of Kantian Physicalism.  Thesis 2 also generates considerable trouble for those seeking to give a general account of the metaphysical nature of dispositional and categorical properties.  For once the claim that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties is accepted, one inherits the burden of explaining this dependency.  And providing a satisfactory account of this dependency has proven to be a difficult project. 
To get a sense of the difficulties, let’s take a look at two of the more influential accounts of dispositional and categorical properties.  One account, offered by Prior et al. (1982), maintains that dispositional properties are higher-level properties that are realized by lower-level categorical properties.  Under this account, the co-instantiation of dispositional properties and categorical properties occurs because the latter realize the former.  But this explanation of the dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties comes at a well-documented cost: When instantiated in objects, higher-level properties are either responsible for effects that are overdetermined or are causally pre-empted by their lower-level realizers and thereby rendered epiphenomenal.​[12]​  Here is a characterization of the basic problem, taken from John Heil:  

Suppose H1 and H2 are higher-level properties possessed by some object, o, over successive intervals; and suppose you are inclined to think that o’s being H1 causes o to be H2.  Suppose, further, that H1 is realized in o, by P1 (some complex physical property), that H2 is realized by P2, and that o’s being P1 is the cause of o’s being P2.  Then it would seem that o’s being H2 is embarrassingly overdetermined: H2 is on the scene because P2 is at hand; and H2 is present because H1 is.  Maybe o’s being H1 brings about o’s being H2, not directly, but by making it the case that o is P2.  But now o’s being P2 is evidently overdetermined.  (2003, p. 33, his emphasis)

Treating dispositional properties as being higher-level properties that are realized by lower-level categorical properties can explain why dispositional properties are co-instantiated with categorical properties, but it does so at the cost of either overdetermining the effects of dispositional properties or rendering them causally impotent.  
When faced with this problem, Jackson opts for the route of epiphenomenalism.​[13]​  The decision in favor of epiphenomenalism looks especially bad, however, if one keeps Thesis 1 in view. If the physical sciences can only epistemically distinguish the dispositional properties of an object, and the dispositional properties of an object are causally pre-empted by their categorical realizers, then it appears that the physical sciences are incapable of epistemically distinguishing any of the causally efficacious properties of the objects they aim to describe!​[14]​
	One way to avoid these problems would be to reduce dispositional properties to the categorical properties they depend upon.  Consider, for example, the early account of dispositions given by David Armstrong (1968).  (To be fair, Armstrong currently espouses an account of dispositions that differs from his earlier account.​[15]​  To disambiguate, the 1968 account will be referred to as that of “Early Armstrong”.)  Early Armstrong argues that dispositional properties are contingently identical with the categorical properties they depend upon.  This contingent identification proceeds via two steps: In the first step, a dispositional property is analyzed in terms of something akin to a causal role (e.g. brittleness is analyzed in terms of an object’s breaking in the appropriate circumstances). In the second step, the dispositional property in question is identified with the causal basis (or occupant) of this role (e.g. brittleness is identified with the molecular structure that supports the above causal role).  The resultant identification between dispositional property and categorical property is contingent because it is possible that the causal role in question could have been supported by a categorical property other than the one that, in fact, supports it.​[16]​   
	Unlike the account given by Prior et al., Early Armstrong’s account has no problem making sense of the causal efficacy of dispositional properties.  Under this account, dispositional properties aren’t in competition with or screened off by their categorical realizers because they are those realizers.  Indeed, Early Armstrong’s position is really best viewed as a version of property monism where all properties are, at root, categorical properties.  (One could call such a position “Categoricalism”.)  Under Categoricalism, dispositional concepts end up referring to categorical properties; it’s just that they characterize these categorical properties in terms of their actual and possible causal interactions with other objects and not in terms of their intrinsic nature, qua categorical properties.  (Notice that this is one way of fleshing out the suggestion that science uses relational names to refer to categorical properties.)
Despite its success in explicating the causal efficacy of dispositional properties, there is a serious problem with Early Armstrong’s attempt to contingently identify dispositional properties with categorical properties.​[17]​  Dispositional and categorical predicates are names of properties and, as such, should act like rigid designators.  But if this is true, then the identity between a given dispositional property and its categorical basis ought to be necessary, and not contingent as Early Armstrong claims that it is.  As (Later) Armstrong puts the problem:

Given that the laws of nature are contingent…then in some world where the laws of nature are different, it would be possible for the brittle object to have just the first-order properties that it has and yet not be disposed to shatter if struck.  A certain bonding of molecules that produces the shattering in this world would not play that causal role in another world.  An identification of brittleness with such bonding would make ‘brittle’ no more than a non-rigid designator of the disposition.  As such, it cannot claim to catch the Dispositional essence. (1997, p. 72, his emphasis)

As a contrast, return to the account of dispositional properties offered by Prior et al.  Under that account, a dispositional predicate does not refer to a lower-level categorical property that realizes a certain type of causal role; rather, it refers the causal role itself (i.e. it refers to a higher-level property).  And this, in turn, ensures that a dispositional predicate is a rigid-designator that catches the dispositional essence of the property that it refers to.  The price of identifying dispositional properties with such higher-level properties, however, is that they are rendered causally inert (or that their effects are embarrassingly overdetermined).
To summarize the discussion so far: It is widely thought that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties (Thesis 2).  When we try to explicate the sense in which the former depend upon the latter, however, we are quickly led to some real difficulties.  What’s needed is an account of this dependency that does not render dispositional properties causally inefficacious or redundant (in contrast to the account of Prior et al.) and that treats dispositional predicates as rigid designators that catch the dispositional essence of their referents (in contrast to the account of Early Armstrong).  In addition, an account of dispositional and categorical properties should also accommodate the idea that our concepts of these properties provide an accurate characterization of them.  After all, to reject the idea that these concepts accurately characterize their referents is to flirt with eliminativism with respect to those properties!
	A theory that promises to meet these requirements has been offered by C.B. Martin (1996 and 1997) and John Heil (2003, 2004, and 2005). Like Early Armstrong, Martin and Heil identify dispositional properties with categorical properties.​[18]​  Unlike Early Armstrong, however, they do not treat categorical properties as being more fundamental than dispositional properties; rather, they maintain that every property (more specifically, every property of concrete, spatiotemporal particulars) is simultaneously dispositional and categorical, and that “[t]he dispositional and the qualitative are equally basic and irreducible; there is no direction for one being basic in a property and the other being ‘supervenient’.” (Martin 1997, p. 216)
	The Martin/Heil thesis claims that two distinct concepts—a dispositional concept and a categorical concept—each provide an incomplete characterization of one and the same property.  This property, in turn, is not a composite of two distinct ontological entities (one might call them “property-sides”), one of which is dispositional and the other categorical.  Rather, there is just one ontological entity on the scene—the unitary property itself—that is correctly described as dispositional and as categorical.  As a result, the characterizations provided by our dispositional and categorical concepts are not, by themselves, complete characterizations of a given property, nor are they complete characterizations of any ontological entity that is a component element of that property.  The resultant position ends up looking a bit like Dispositionalism in that it posits that there is a necessary connection between a given type of property and the dispositional powers that property conveys upon its bearers.  It differs from Dispositionalism, however, in positing that a given property’s essence contains more than just powers—it also contains categoricity.
You might doubt whether the Martin/Heil account is coherent. Armstrong (2005, p. 315), for instance, says that—

I confess that I find this totally incredible.  If anything is a category mistake, it is a category mistake to identify a quality—a categorical property—and a power, essentially something that points to a certain effect.  They are just different, that’s all.

But the proposal is not totally incredible. Under the Martin/Heil thesis, the categorical/dispositional distinction is a distinction of conception, not a distinction of property.  Dispositional concepts characterize their referents as pointing beyond their possessors to various manifestations/causal interactions while categorical concepts characterize their referents as making a contribution to their possessors that is independent of the circumstances it is in and the objects it is causally interacting with. The characterizations provided by these concepts are inconsistent with one another only if they are each viewed as being a complete characterization of the intrinsic nature of a property.  Earlier, however, it was pointed out that these concepts are silent on the question of whether there is more to the properties they refer to than the characterization they provide.  And if these concepts are not offering complete characterizations of the intrinsic nature of a given property, then there is no inconsistency; some of the (intrinsic) nature of that property is correctly characterized as pointing to certain effects/manifestations and some of its (intrinsic) nature is correctly characterized as categorical. 
	There is an unfortunate tendency when doing metaphysics to assume that predicates line up with properties.  For someone in the grip of this tendency, the fact that a dispositional predicate and a categorical predicate both truly apply to an object could be taken to prove that that object has a property with a nature that is completely characterized by the dispositional predicate and another property with a nature that is completely characterized by the categorical predicate.  (Or, at the very least, it could be taken to prove that that object has a composite property that contains a component part—a property-side—that is completely characterized by the dispositional predicate and another, distinct property-side that is completely characterized by the categorical predicate.)  This tendency, in turn, could be another source of resistance to the Martin/Heil account of dispositional and categorical properties.
Once this tendency is identified, however, it is relatively easy to resist.  There is a growing consensus within metaphysics that people should be wary of putting too much weight on language as a guide to ontology.​[19]​ The assumption that since dispositional and categorical predicates appear to be providing complete characterizations of properties (or property-sides), they are providing complete characterizations of properties (or property-sides) is an instance of the kind of hubris about language that this recent work in metaphysics is warning us about.  (A similar point applies, mutatis mutandis, to our concepts of properties.  Just because categorical and dispositional concepts provide characterizations of properties (or property-sides) that appear as though they could be complete characterizations of properties (or property-sides), it doesn’t follow that these characterizations are complete characterizations of properties (or property-sides).)
Now that the Martin/Heil theory has been introduced and defended, one can see that it offers an account of the dependence of dispositional properties upon categorical properties that escapes the problems of the accounts offered by Prior et al. and by Early Armstrong.  To start with, under the Martin/Heil account there are no concerns about causal pre-emption or overdetermination, for there are not two kinds of property—a higher-level dispositional property and a lower-level categorical property—that compete as causes. (Strictly speaking, it would be tokens of each kind of property that compete as causes.)  Rather, there is just one kind of property that is simultaneously both dispositional and categorical in nature. (And because that property is a unitary entity, it’s not as though it is composed of dispositional and categorical property-sides that compete for the status of cause.) 
Now consider the problem facing the account of Early Armstrong.  Under Early Armstrong’s account, dispositional predicates end up rigidly designating categorical properties and, as a result, fail to catch the dispositional essence of their referents.  Under the Martin/Heil view, however, dispositional properties are not reduced to categorical properties; rather, the dispositional and the categorical are equally basic in a given property.  So under this account, dispositional predicates are rigid designators that catch the dispositional essence of their referents—in every world where a dispositional predicate refers, the property that it refers to will point beyond itself to various manifestations/causal interactions in the appropriate manner.  And finally, the Martin/Heil position is not eliminativist.  For under this position, a dispositional and a categorical concept each provide an accurate characterization of the essence of a property, just not a complete characterization of that essence.  
In this manner, the Martin/Heil theory offers an account of the dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties that sidesteps some of the nasty problems of other, better-established accounts.  To be fair, the position is not without some controversial implications.  For instance, the Martin/Heil position is flagrantly anti-Humean: If every property is, in part, irreducibly dispositional, then it follows that there is a (metaphysically) necessary connection between an object possessing an intrinsic property and that object entering into (or being capable of entering into) certain causal interactions.  (This, of course, is also a problem for the Dispositionalist.)
This and the other potential costs of the Martin/Heil theory should not be discounted.  On the other side, it’s hard to ignore the potential benefits; it’s hard to ignore the fact that this theory gives an account of the dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties that seems to skate right past the problems of the more popular accounts of Prior et al. and Early Armstrong.  In virtue of these advantages, the Martin/Heil position warrants serious consideration as an account of the relation between dispositional and categorical properties.  And this theory has another advantage: It provides a response to the challenge of categorical properties that avoids the problems of Stoljar’s response and of Kantian Physicalism.

4. The Martin/Heil Thesis and the Challenge of Categorical Properties
In section 2, it was shown how two widely accepted theses—(1) the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects it studies, and (2) dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties—seem to guarantee that physics-based definition of Physicalism will be false or, at the very least, seriously compromised.  The goal, recall, is to develop a particular type of Physicalist response to this challenge, a response that accepts Thesis 2 (unlike Dispositionalism), sticks with a unitary physics-based definition of Physicalism (unlike Stoljar’s response), and doesn’t entail that the physical sciences will be unable to epistemically distinguish a kind of property (unlike Kantian Physicalism). 
In section 3, a new account of the relationship between dispositional and categorical properties was introduced: The Martin/Heil account.  This account is promising in terms of its ability to handle some of the problem besetting other, more popular theories of the relation between dispositional and categorical properties. As it turns out, the Martin/Heil account also offers a new solution to the challenge of categorical properties, a solution that meets the above-mentioned criteria.
	According to the Martin/Heil position, there are no properties with intrinsic natures that are completely categorical; rather, every property has an intrinsic nature that is incompletely characterized as categorical and incompletely characterized as dispositional. But given that each property contains at least some categoricity and given that the physical sciences are incapable of epistemically distinguishing different kinds of categoricity from one another, it is natural to wonder if the Martin/Heil theory entails that the physical sciences will be incapable of epistemically distinguishing the properties it refers to.  Does the Martin/Heil position simply bring one back to Kantian Physicalism, albeit by a new route?  
	The answer is no.  Under the Martin/Heil position, every property is a unitary entity, not a composite entity that contains a purely dispositional property-side and a purely categorical property-side.  Since a given property is not a composite formed of distinct property-sides, what is dispositional in a given property cannot be metaphysically separated from what’s categorical in it—the same kind of dispositionality is always accompanied by the same categoricity, and vice versa.  This fact, in turn, has important implications for the question of whether the physical sciences can epistemically distinguish all the properties that they refer to.  If the same kind of categoricity always accompanies the same kind of dispositionality, it follow that epistemically distinguishing a property’s dispositionality will be sufficient for epistemically distinguishing the property itself.  So although a given property’s dispositionality does not exhaust its intrinsic nature, epistemically distinguishing that dispositionality is sufficient for epistemically distinguishing that property for, by hypothesis, there can be no other property that has that same dispositionality while differing in its categoricity.
	With this in mind, let’s return to the challenge of categorical properties.  According to the thesis of Physicalism, any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our world will be a duplicate simpliciter of our world.  According to physics-based definitions of Physicalism, a physical duplicate of our world is a world that contains all and only the entities that the physical sciences describe our world as having.  But if the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of our world (Thesis 1) and our world also contains some categorical properties (Thesis 2), then it seems as though a minimal physical duplicate of our world will fail to be a duplicate simpliciter of our world, for it will fail to contain the categorical properties of our world.  In short, it appears that Physicalism is destined to be false.
But under the Martin/Heil theory, one can allow that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties while rejecting the claim that our world contains a class of entities not present in a minimal physical duplicate of it, for under this theory dispositional properties are categorical properties.  In this manner, Physicalism is saved from the challenge of categorical properties in a way that does not force one to bifurcate the notion of the physical.  And since, under this theory, epistemically distinguishing a property’s dispositionality is sufficient for epistemically distinguishing the property itself, there is no reason to think that the physical sciences will fail to epistemically distinguish a kind of property instantiated in the actual world.  So Kantian Physicalism is also avoided.  
This last advantage of the Martin/Heil thesis—the avoidance of Kantian Physicalism—is related to an argument that Dispositionalists often give in favor of their theory.​[20]​  Simplifying somewhat, the argument is this: If, in contrast to Dispositionalism, properties are only contingently connected to the powers they convey to their bearers, then we will not be able to epistemically distinguish these properties from one other (for reasons akin to those given earlier in this paper).  But if we can’t epistemically distinguish properties from one another, then we can’t know or even refer to them!​[21]​  Many people have doubts about this kind of argument; in particular, there are doubts about the assumption that if we can’t epistemically distinguish a property, we can’t know or refer to it.​[22]​ Notice that this controversial assumption does not, however, play a role in the above account of how the Martin/Heil thesis overcomes Kantian Physicalism.  Although the Martin/Heil thesis yields an advantage (in that it makes it possible, in principle, for the physical sciences to epistemically distinguish all the properties instantiated in the actual world), one can remain agnostic on whether this advantage leads to the other, more controversial advantages that Dispositionalists often claim for their theory.

5. Conclusion
Physicalism is the thesis that the physical sciences provide a complete story about our world.  In this paper, however, it has been revealed that there are different senses in which this story could be said to be complete.  It could be claimed that the story provided by the physical sciences is “complete” in that the physical sciences: 1) are capable of epistemically distinguishing all the properties of the world from one another, and 2) do so in virtue of providing a complete and exhaustive characterization of the essences of those properties.  If the physical sciences were “complete” in this manner, they would be complete in the ideal sense of the word. Unfortunately, the fact that at least some of the essences of some of these properties are categorical shows us that the physical sciences cannot be “complete” in this sense.    
In response to this, it could be claimed that the physical sciences provide a complete story about the world in a much weaker sense of the word “complete”.  More specifically, it could be claimed that the physical sciences are “complete” in that they refer to all the properties of the world.  But under such a proposal, we are left with a disturbing version of Physicalism—Kantian Physicalism—under which the physical sciences are incapable of epistemically distinguishing many of the fundamental properties of our world.  
	In this paper, a new account of the dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties has been examined and defended: The Martin/Heil account.  This account, in turn, yields a third way of understanding the sense in which the physical sciences offer us a “complete” picture of the world.  The physical sciences are “complete” in that they can epistemically distinguish all the properties instantiated in our world, even though they do not provide an exhaustive characterization of the essences of those properties.  















^1	 NOTESThe inspiration for this paper occurred while I was a resident in John Heil’s 2006 N.E.H. Summer Seminar, “Mind and Metaphysics”, at Washington University (in St. Louis).  My debt to Heil should be apparent.  Brendan O’Sullivan also deserves recognition for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper and, more generally, for many helpful conversations about dispositional and categorical properties.  I also want to thank an anonymous referee from this journal for various insightful comments.  Nothing in the upcoming arguments, however, turns on understanding Physicalism via a supervenience claim.  These arguments could, for instance, be framed using Melnyk’s (2003) realization characterization of Physicalism.
^2	  It is important to note that this is not how Jackson (1998) characterizes “the physical”.  Rather, he offers an ostensive characterization of that notion.  
^3	  Philosophers who accept the claim that dispositional properties are intrinsic properties include Martin (1994), Heil (2003 and 2005), Molnar (2003), and Bird (2007).
^4	  For just a small sample of this literature, see Kim (1982), Humberstone (1996), and Langton and Lewis (1998).  For an overview, see Weatherson (2008).
^5	  For an attempt to locate the thesis that dispositional properties are intrinsic properties against the background of attempts to analyze intrinsicality more generally, see Whittle (2006).
^6	  Some draw an even stronger moral: Namely, that for every dispositional property there is a categorical property (or categorical properties) such that the instantiation of the latter is metaphysically sufficient for the instantiation of the former. (The stronger formulation is taken from Stoljar 2001.) For purposes of this paper, it doesn’t matter which reading—the stronger or the weaker—is given to Thesis 2.
^7	  See for example, Campbell (1976), Armstrong (1997), Martin (1997), and Heil (2003).
^8	  See, for example, Blackburn (1990) and Unger (2006). 
^9	  It should not be surprising that similar lines of reasoning are sometimes mobilized in support of panpsychist and idealist conclusions. Russell (1927), for example, argues that since the physical sciences don’t tell us anything about the intrinsic character of the properties it studies, there is no reason for positing that these natures must be non-mental.  In the same ballpark are Chalmers (1996) and Blackburn (1990), who both suggest that since the best candidate we have for understanding what categorical properties are like involves qualitative properties of experience, we should take seriously the possibility that all categorical properties are mental in nature.  
^10	  Shoemaker (1980) and Bird (2007) are both Dispositionalists.
^11	  In this passage, Jackson is assuming that if we cannot epistemically distinguish categorical properties, then we cannot know about them.  This assumption will be revisited in section 4. 
^12	  The work of Jaegwon Kim (1993 and 1998) has been especially important in establishing this point.  
^13	  See Jackson 1998, p. 92
^14	  A similar complaint can be found in Lange 2002, p. 79-81.
^15	  See, for example, Armstrong 1997
^16	  The differences between the account of Prior et al. and the account of Early Armstrong parallel the differences between “Functional State Identity Theory” and the “Functional Specification” versions of Functionalism.  (This terminology comes from Block 1980.) According to the Functional State Identity Theory, a mental property is a higher-level property—the property of being in a state that plays a type of causal role.  According to the Functional Specification account, a mental property is a lower-level property—the property of the state that is responsible for it playing the previously mentioned role.
^17	  Discussion of the following objection can be found in Prior et al. 1982, Armstrong 1997, and Fara 2006.
^18	  Martin and Heil would not describe their position in exactly this way—they prefer to use “qualitative properties”, not “categorical properties”, in describing the contrast to dispositional properties. This terminological difference is not important.  
^19	  See, for example, Armstrong (1989), Heil (2003), Lowe (2006), and Bird (2007).
^20	  An anonymous referee pointed out this similarity.
^21	  Examples of this kind of argument can be found in Shoemaker (1980), Jackson (1998), and Bird (2007).  
^22	  See, for example, Langton (2004), Schaffer (2005), and Whittle (2006).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